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Abstract. Industrial pollution can have damaging effects on resource-based
productive sectors. International trade creates opportunities for overexploitation of the open-access renewable resource but also for separating the sectors
spatially. The paper shows that, depending on the relative damage inflicted
by the two industries on the environment, it is possible that the production
externality will persist and that specialization in the dirty good may not be
the obvious choice from a welfare perspective. Also, the resource exporter does
not necessarily have to lose from trade even when specializing incompletely,
due to the partially offsetting external effects.

JEL Classification: Q27, Q22, Q53
July 24, 2006

1. Introduction
Around the world, mostly in developing countries, but by no means limited
to them, open-access fishing areas are often located in the proximity of polluting
manufacturing facilities. Examples range from the North Atlantic salmon fishery,1
to the lobster fishery in the North Pacific, the collapsed walleye fishery in the
Tittabawassee River in Michigan, the Baia Mare, Romania cyanide pollution of
the rivers adjacent to gold mines and countless (less publicized) local problems in
the less-developed world. As the more biology-oriented literature documents, for
many species of fish, the nursery grounds are located in the coastal areas, which are
also the more polluted ones, due to the toxic waste spilled directly into the sea, or
carried by rivers from inland. Due in part to poor regulation of the environment,
many developing countries experienced an accelerated depletion of their resources
after opening up to international trade. The welfare effects of this form of tragedy
of the commons amplified by trade are likely to be quite significant in poor, small,
developing economies, where the resource sector has an important share both in
exports and GDP. At the same time, the phenomenon of dirty-industry migration
from North to South - as a possible effect of tightening up of standards in the
developed world - may result in increased industrial pollution of the environment.
Openness makes both scenarios theoretically plausible.
Renewable resources can be under two types of pressures: excessive harvesting,
especially where there is no effective management, and pollution from other sectors.
Previous work has looked at each of these pressures individually. Brander and
Key words and phrases. renewable resources, pollution, production externalities, environment,
international trade.
Many thanks to Prof. Brian Copeland and Prof. Sumeet Gulati for valuable suggestions. The
usual caveat applies.
1
Among the chief causes cited as contributing to the collapse of North Atlantic fisheries were
pollution and over-harvesting.
1
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Taylor (1997) show that a small open economy that exports an open access resource
will suffer resource depletion and will incur a long run real income loss, whereas a
country that imports the resource will gain from trade, because pressure is taken off
the resource. Copeland and Taylor (1999) show that with a cross-sectoral pollution
externality, trade tends to cause small countries to specialize. Severe resource
depletion may occur. Also, in their model, a resource exporting country will gain
from trade because it leads to a contraction of the polluting sector. However, many
renewable resources are in reality concomitantly subject to both types of pressures.
The interaction between pollution and international trade has been extensively
studied recently. The approach used in the recent book by Copeland and Taylor
(2003)is to build a unified GE framework which allows them to clearly identify
the various effects that characterize the interaction and to take into account the
endogenous nature of environmental policy. Yet, as they acknowledge, for poor
resource exporters, the evolution of the stock of natural resources with trade is
likely to be more important than pollution for their welfare (Copeland and Taylor
(2003), p. 362). The manufacturing sector is generally under-developed and so the
effects of additional local pollution on the consumers are likely to be low. Then,
a key mechanism identified by the authors as influencing the level of pollution
with trade: namely the endogenous policy response - may not play as important a
role.2 However, the existence of a polluting sector and its external effects cannot
be dismissed even in these economies. Some would argue it is likely to become even
more of a problem, as production in the North moves towards cleaner service-based
sectors while the South gets a higher share of world’s manufacturing.
The literature documents many instances of habitat quality influencing population levels, harvesting, and having detrimental welfare effects. For instance, several
examples are provided in Knowler (2002), in a review of bioeconomic models employed to estimate the welfare effects of environmental quality.3 Relying on the
motivating examples discussed above, the basic question addressed in this paper is:
what is the effect of trade when an un-managed renewable resource is subject to the
two interacting problems: overharvesting and pollution? The present work builds
on the baseline Brander and Taylor (1997) model and the subsequent Brander and
Taylor (1998) and resembles the two in the fact that it deals with an open-access
natural resource and the impact of international trade on its stock. It departs from
the original Brander and Taylor framework in that it also assumes the existence of
production externalities, as in Copeland and Taylor (1999). However, unlike the
latter model, where the production in the clean sector is only a function of the
“environmental capital” stock,4 in the present paper the production of the “clean”
good also depletes the stock of the resource. It is argued that the fact that both

2

Another reason may be that the democratic channels by which higher pollution triggers a
policy response may not be functioning properly.
3
Some examples provided in Knowler (2002) include: the effect of changes in water salinity
on shrimp catch in Pamlico Sound, North Carolina (Swallow (1994)), the impact of increased
nutrient and sediment loads on aquatic vegetation in Chesapeake Bay (Kahn and Kemp 1985),
the effect of increased nutrient concentration on the Black Sea anchovy fishery in Knowler and
Barbier (2001). Even closer to the spirit of this paper, Loomis (1998) analyze the effect of logging
on the downstream fisheries in the form of sediments and water temperature changes.
4
i.e. cleanliness of a river, soil and there is no harvesting of the renewable resource per se.
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sectors exert a differentiated pressure on the stock of the resource proves to be
important in establishing the results.5
To briefly preview the results, the autarkic equilibrium in this economy is inefficient. Besides the open access problem, whose magnitude is a function of demand
parameters, there is the uninternalized effect of pollution. However, opening up to
trade allows the economy to potentially do better in the long run. Non-traditional
gains from trade occur from spatially separating the conflicting sectors by focusing production on the area of comparative advantage. It is argued that - under
certain conditions - specialization in the “dirty” good can be detrimental, while
specialization in the resource good can be welfare-improving.6 The policy relevance
of the paper may be framed in terms of the industrial planning challenges faced
by a small resource-endowed developing economy that eventually becomes open to
trade. Even when disutility costs to consumers are small, excessive industrialization
imposes external costs via the environment-based sectors.
Starting with a small open economy, the analysis then moves further to endogenize the international price formation in a two-countries case. The analysis
of welfare changes can give an indication as to what drives the results and will
possibly suggest a direction for policy measures. If the only commodity that is
traded once the economy opens up to trade is the manufacturing good, then spatial separation will likely reduce the stress on the resource and may bring welfare
gains, provided that the country in question starts importing the industrial good.
If the resource-based product (e.g. fish) is also tradable,7 then overdepletion makes
the results ambiguous, and several cases may develop, based on the parameters
of the system. The two externalities here have partially offsetting effects, which
in autarchy could bring the economy closer to a first best optimum than in the
simple over-harvesting fishery model. As can be expected, opening up to trade
alters these effects. Whether the country stays diversified or completely specializes
in one of the sectors with trade will play a role in deciding the welfare gains or
losses from trade, as will the relative impact of the two sectors on the stock of the
resource. Here the economy can in fact specialize in any of the sectors, and trade
can bring a welfare improvement or a welfare decline. Increasing production in the
relatively more harmful sector will have the effect of decreasing the stock under the
autarkic steady state level, while (even incompletely) specializing in the relatively
environmentally-friendly sector will raise the stock above it, likely influencing the
comparative advantage of the country.
There are not many papers dealing explicitly with the issue of renewable resources management with pollution. However, a few papers deal with related issues.
Knowler, Barbier and Strand (2002) look at the effect on the stock of a resource
of nutrient concentration increase of water. However, here the polluting factor is
exogenous and there is no trade-off between the resource sector and the polluting sector, which is captured in our model. McConnell and Strand (1989) analyze
5
Thinking about other real-life examples: if sector H is tourism and sector M is a polluting
manufacture, it is likely that both activities pollute the adjacent lake or river, although conceivably,
to quite different degrees. Also, given the wide evidence documenting the damaging effect of
aquaculture for the environment, M can be thought of as fish or shrimp farming, while H is the
harvesting of the wild resource.
6
In a stylized way, this result runs contrary to the so-called Dutch Disease “symptoms” of the
“Natural Resources Curse”.
7
And this is the less restrictive, more realistic case.
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water quality impact on commercial fishing when consumer perception of better
water quality shifts out demand, while the supply of fish increases as well with
water quality. Here the open-access dimension is missing, and the focus is domestic. Also, a special issue of Environmental Resource Economics dedicated to the
Economics of Non-convex Ecosystems8 contains papers that specifically deal with
existence of competitive equilibria, multiple basins of attraction, threshold and positive feedback effects and the local aspect of many environmental externalities. The
closest to this work is a recent paper by Smulders, van Soest and Withagen (2004)
which focuses on habitat destruction by having a specific factors model with three
sector, two of which are dependant on ‘land’ as a resource base (harvesting) or factor of production (agriculture). While the paper is similar in the sense that their
model also includes both ‘within-industry’ and ‘between industry’ externalities, the
driving force of their results is the interplay between the negative long-run stock
effects and the positive short-run search costs reducing effect of a shrinking habitat
size. Their work also reverses some of the results in Brander and Taylor papers,
yet the model seems to only apply to terrestrial resources.9 In the present paper,
inter-industry externalities are only negative: pollution reduces the stock size, diminishing productivity in the harvesting sector, and it also increases the implicit
search costs, as sparsely distributed marine resources are harder to catch. To the
best knowledge of the author, the exact focus of this paper, who better fits the
pollution-marine life motivating example, has not been previously undertaken.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section analyzes the
autarkic general equilibrium in the short run and then in the long run, introducing
a non-convexity issue. The third section then looks at the open economy equilibrium, analyzing possible specialization avenues and their impact on the stock of the
resource and on welfare. The last section concludes and points to possible future
research directions.
2. The Autarkic Model
Let the stock of the renewable resource S grow according to a natural growth
rate G(S), like in the original Gordon-Schäfer model.
dS
= G(S(t)) − H(t) − Z(t)
dt
where H is the harvest level and Z is the detrimental effect of pollution on the
resource growth and where we take the stock S to follow a logistic growth function
that was shown to perform quite well empirically for some species of fish:10

(2.1)

G(S) = rS(1 −

S
)
K

8
ERE (December 2003, Volume 26 Issue 4), with papers from: Dasgupta and Mäler, Chave and
Levin, Scholes, Brock and Starrett, Mäler, Xepapadeas, and de Zeeuw, Crepin, Arrow, Dasgupta
and Mäler, which are concerned with topics such as the economics of savannas, pollution in shallow
lakes, multiple species forests and sustainable development.
9
For marine resources it is harder to come up with activities that physically diminish the
habitat.
10 Brander and Taylor (1997) list Pearl (1930) and Feller (1940) for empirical support of the
logistic form of growth and Paterson and Wilen (1977) for empirical support of the choice of
harvesting production function. See Brander and Taylor (1997), p. 531-532.
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where r, the intrinsic growth rate of the resource and K, the carrying capacity are
known parameters.11
It can be seen from equation (2.1) that activity in both sectors of the economy
influence the change of stock.12 As shown in the original fishery model, under open
access, extraction will occur at zero profit levels, due to free entry into the sector
that has the effect of driving rents to zero. The added complication here is the
negative externality imposed by the polluting sector.
2.1. Supply.
There are two productive sectors in this economy: harvesting of the renewable
natural resource (H) and manufacturing (M). Both sectors are using one primary
input: labour (L). In addition, H-production also depends on the stock of the
resource according to a typical Schäfer yield function:
(2.2)

H = qSLH ,

while
(2.3)

M = LM

that is, manufacturers use only labour and produce according to this very simple
constant returns production function. However, this is a polluting activity. Pollution (Z) is generated at rate alpha in the process, so that
Z = αM = αLM .
Assume pollution does not accumulate13, there is no abatement and no pollution
policy14 and emissions intensity is α.
Let M be the numeraire commodity and so
pM = 1.
From the zero-profit condition in the M-sector: ΠM = M − wLM = 0 we obtain
w = 1.
Because L is the only factor firms in the harvesting industry have to pay for
under open access, profits will be:
ΠH = pH − wLH = pqSLH − wLH
11 Jinji endogenizes the carrying capacity. In his forestry model K depends linearly on the

stock of the “base resource:” land. A number of comparative statics exercises can be performed
when K is allowed to vary. See Jinji (2003), p. 6.
12 To be accurate, due to the multiplicity of biological/natural and anthropogenic interactions
existent in a marine environment, there is little conclusive evidence to date that ‘normal’ pollution
actually kills fish, except for ‘ecological disasters.’ However, the scientific evidence that pollution
leads to perturbations in the reproducing system of fish is available. Thus, the effect of the
pollution externality on the stock of fish can also enter in a more complicated manner than here,
namely via an intrinsic growth function r(Z) that is decreasing in pollution: dr/dZ<0. Yet,
our specification is equivalent to one in which the ‘true’ intrinsic growth rate ρ is diminished
by a properly-weighted pollution effect to yield the ‘actual’ intrinsic growth rate r as follows:
S −1
) ].
(1 − K
r = [ρ − Z
S
13 Pollution just flows downstream if the pollutant and the clean sector are located along a
river. Treating pollution as a stock might be more appropriate for lakes or oceans. This scenario
is omitted here for simplicity.
14 there is no regulation that internalizes any of the two externalities: open-access or pollution.
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and the free entry/zero profit condition implies:
1
.
qS
Therefore, if both sectors of the economy are active in autarky, the relative price
of the harvesting good is determined by the stock level.

(2.4)

w = pqS ⇒ p =

2.2. Demand.
On the demand side, there is a representative consumer with preferences described by a Cobb-Douglas utility function including both goods, and with (1-β)
the share of M, β the share of H in total spending.15 In the first best equilibrium
there are resource rents. However, in our open-access framework, rents are dissipated and the only income accruing to the consumer is the wage. The consumer
supplies inelastically one unit of labour and solves:
β
1−β
s.t. pH + M = w.
M ax U = H M
H,M

Demands are then determined by their respective income shares, as usual:16
(1−β)w
and on aggregate H = wβL
H = βw
p , M = (1 − β)wL,
1
p ,M =
where L is the total endowment of labour, which coincides here with total population. Then we get
βL
f or w = 1.
(2.5)
p=
H
2.3. The Short Run Autarkic Equilibrium.
Since there is only one primary factor L, the economy is Ricardian and the
temporary PPF will be a straight line, as both firms and consumers’ problems
assume a fixed stock of the resource S. Notice the fact that in the short run the
negative production externality does not manifest itself.17 For a given stock of the
H
, while LM = M . The labour employment in the economy is
resource S, LH = qS
H
which implies that
divided between harvesting and manufacturing: L = M + qS
H = qSL − qSM
describes the linear temporary PPF. The short-run equilibrium is found by equating
expressions (2.4) and (2.5). This yields
(2.6)

H = qβLS and M = (1 − β)L

as the short-run equilibrium outputs.
15 The focus on production externalities developed here is particularly applicable to developing resources-based economies: their environments are still relatively pristine and the health
consequences of industrial pollution may not be as severe, thereby making the assumption of no
consumer-disutility of pollution more credible. Also, an endogenous policy response mechanism
may not work, due to the fact that environmental-groups pressure is weak and/or the countries’
democratic channels are not functioning properly.
16 Yet another assumption implicit in our model is that pollution or perceived water quality
does not shift demand for fish, as in McConnel and Strand (1989), p. 285-287), where consumers
use water quality as an indicator of fish quality. There, better water quality under open access
may have the perverse effect of reducing social surplus.
17 Therefore, the problem is so far similar to Brander and Taylor (1997).
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H
qSL
PPFSR

L

M

Figure 1
In autarky, the use of labour in manufacturing (and therefore the amount of
pollution) does not depend on the use of labour for harvesting, due to fixed proportionality. Then, the evolution of the stock of resource in the short-run can be
obtained by subtracting the effect Z of manufacturing on the change of stock S from
the growth expression, and then interacting it with the harvest function to find the
open-access level of stock S 0 .
In Figure 2, A would be the open-access extraction point in the absence of the
manufacturing sector, or if there was no production externality. With pollution,
we have:
Z(t) = α(1 − β)L
which would be a straight line if represented in the space of Figure 2. Given the
level of pollution Z, which is not a function of the stock S, the open-access stock
equilibrium condition for the renewable resource is still that: dS
dt = 0, which implies
(2.7)

H(t) + Z(t) = G(S(t)).

As it is apparent from the picture, the harvest will take place at a lower level in
the presence of pollution of the stock, as one would expect.
Substituting the known expressions into (2.7) we get:
S
qβLS + α(1 − β)L = rS(1 − )
K
which is a quadratic equation yielding two possible steady states S1A and S2A as
functions of the parameters.
Solving the quadratic equation:
r 2
S + (qβL − r)S + α(1 − β)L = 0
K
yields as discriminant ∆ = (qβL − r)2 − 4r
K α(1 − β)L and the roots are:
√
r − qβL ± ∆
.
S1,2 =
2r/K
When ∆ > 0, the roots are real and there exists a non-extinction steady-state
(SS). If ∆ < 0, then, due to pollution and the given cost of harvesting, there is no
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dS/dt,H
(TR,TC)

G(S)-Z
(TR)
B

O
(K)

SA2

Se

A’

qSLH
(TC)

A

S
(L,S)

SA1 So
(stock increases)

(effort increases)

Figure 2
interior solution: no feasible fishery due to excessive pollution. The condition for
the existence of real roots is that
4r
(2.8)
(qβL − r)2 > α(1 − β)L
K
which can be loosely translated as: high q (the productivity parameter in harvesting), high β (strong consumer preference for H), low intrinsic growth rate (r), high
carrying capacity of the environment (K).
Denoting by S1A , S2A the two autarkic steady-state stock levels, notice from
the graph in Figure
2 that S1A is stable, while S2A is not, where S1A is the lower
√
r−qβL− ∆
. This means that, regardless of the starting stock level S0 ,
root: S1 =
2r/K
provided it is not to the left of S2A ,18 the stock level will move to S1A in the long
run closed economy. Notice that the level of the stock in the long run under open
access and with no pollution (α = 0) is S A = K(1 − qβL
r ).
Now plugging S1A into (2.4) and (2.6) we get pA = qS1A and H A = qβLS1A , M A =
1
(1 − β)L, respectively.
Note by referring again to the graph, that provided the level of pollution Z is
too high, which is the same as saying if α, (1 − β), L are “too high,”19 we can
get the case where no exploitation of the resource is possible, due to the strong
externality that decreases the stock and raises the costs of extraction. Also, if the
growth function of the stock would be depensatory (which may be the case for some
species or circumstances) instead of taking the compensatory logistic form, then it
may be relatively easy to get extinction and total collapse of the extraction sector,
in which case M ceases to create an externality in production. However, we will
18 The case of initial over-depletion of the renewable resource
19 which means, keeping the order, that: M is very pollution intensive, consumers have strong

tastes for the manufacturing good or the country is very populous, respectively. Interpreting
these conditions confirms the intuition for cases where no equilibrium with strictly positive stock
of resources is possible.
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abstract from such complications here and look instead at interior solutions, where
the economy is diversified and the conditions necessary for S1A > 0 are met by the
parameters.
2.4. Dynamics in Autarky and Non-Convexity.
We turn at this point to analyze the dynamic transition towards the steady state
in this economy. Recall that the PPF in the short run, i.e. for a given stock level S,
is a straight line. In the long run, production adjusts and will be influenced by the
cross-sectoral production externalities, potentially yielding a convex PPF. Because
in a dynamic setting, the manufacturing sector imposes costs to harvesting, the
points on the static PPF will likely not be maintained, with the important exception
of the intercepts. Depending on the parameters, the PPF can now be bowed-in and
the problem can become non-convex due to production externalities, as shown in
the seminal paper by Baumol and Bradford (1972). The basic argument is that
producing the two goods jointly renders some convex combinations infeasible due
to the negative external effect. Consequently, points on the linear short-run PPF
become infeasible in the long-run. In their 1999 paper, Copeland and Taylor show
that such non-convexities can create surprising specialization and trade effects.20
As will be argued below, in our particular case, due to a combination of internal
(intra-industry) and external (inter-industry) negative stock effects, the shape of
the PPF turns out to be more complex.
However, before these specific results are derived, a discussion of the Baumol
and Bradford (1972) result that production externalities are sufficient to cause
non-convex production sets deserves a brief digression that hopefully helps build
some intuition. Here we will just summarize the argument in diagrammatic form.
Assume the M industry is polluting the environment, imposing a negative spillover
effect on the industry that is sensitive to the quality of certain elements of the
environment, A.21 If there is a preferred (low cost) location for both outputs, then
the production possibility frontier PPF is convex (the production set is non-convex)
and spatial separation can in fact act as a ”palliative” to the problem, by expanding
the feasible production set.
Starting with a concave PPF (no externality)22 and increasing the level of the
negative externality between sectors, the production frontier will bend towards the
origin, and eventually become convex. Key to the reasoning is the fact that the end
points of the PPF, namely E and C will not move when the externality becomes
more significant, as they represent cases of total specialization in production, and
thus, cases where cross-sectoral spillovers are immaterial. The convex production
possibilities frontier EFGC corresponds to joint production of both inputs in the
same location. If A is moved to the higher cost location, BC will be the relevant
PPF, while in the case when M is moved there, AD will be the PPF.23

20 See Copeland and Taylor (1999), p. 139
21 M represents energy and A laundry producers in their example. Note the fact that the

use of air pollution is avoided, as this would be unambiguously affecting consumers’ utility and
complicate the analysis.
22 suppose the polluting industry is just starting the dirty manufacturing
23 Note that AD and BC do not have to be linear and can, in fact, be concave.
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Figure 3
Thus, the production possibility set is non-convex provided the externality is
strong enough. Moreover, spatial separation allows for higher total output, illustrated by the fact that the line segments AF and CG are situated above the
respective arc/curve regions.
Returning to our specific model, we now move on to establish the curvature of
the PPF in the long run autarky. We first state a somewhat surprising observation
and postpone the analysis of its implications in an effort to keep the model as simple
as possible.
Proposition 1. Depending on parameter values, it is possible that the long-run
optimum involves partial unemployment of the labour force.
An algebraic derivation is suggested in Appendix D. Intuitively, the long-run
stock of the resource is decreasing in the total labour applied to harvesting and
manufacturing. It may then be optimal, given some parametric conditions, that
total utility maximization involves leaving a fraction LU of total population unemployed. This is easier to accept when a social planner solves the optimization
problem. Here, however, we excluded any conscious planning or optimal management of the resources (S, L) whatsoever.24 The introduction of another entirely
‘clean’ sector will allow getting around the unemployment issue. Here, keeping this
first model manageable dictates the exclusion of these interesting possibilities.
Assuming from now on full employment in the steady state, recall the short run
H
. Also, from equation (2.1) one can write the change in the
PPF25 was L = M + qS
stock of the renewable natural resource as:
S
dS
= rS(1 − ) − qS(L − M ) − αM.
K
dt
Hence, the steady-state level of stock has to satisfy:
S
(2.9)
rS(1 − ) − qS(L − M ) − αM = 0.
K
24 Here, atomistic consumers do not realize that by increasing their effort the stock level is
reduced and so will supply the full amount of labour in a Nash equilibrium.
25 see section 2.3 above.
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H

PPFLR

M

M*

Figure 4
And the labour constraint can be written as:
(2.10)

L=M+

H
qS

To find the long-run PPF, we need to solve (2.9) for S and plug it into the expression
(2.10) above. Solving the quadratic equation and deriving the production possibilities frontier involves some uninformative algebra, and is relegated to Appendix A.
The autarkic stock S can be written as:
1 p
(2.11)
S A = { [q(L − M ) − r]2 K 2 − 4rαKM − [q(L − M ) − r]K}
2r
Plug this into (2.10) to obtain the steady-state PPF of the domestic economy:
(2.12)
q(L − M ) p 2 2
[ K q (L − M )2 + r2 K 2 − 2qK 2 (L − M ) − 4αrKM −Kq(L−M )+rK].
H=
2r
As Appendix A details, convexity of the production possibility set reduces to the
condition that a cubic in M be higher than zero, or the P P F LR is convex for:
4K 2 q 4 (L − M )3 − 3Kq 2 (3Kq − 2αr)(L − M )2 − 12αKq 2 rM (L − M ) + (3K 2 q 2 r2
+3K 2 q 2 + 4α2 r2 − 8αKqr)(L − M ) + 4αr(Kq − 2αr)M − Kr2 (Kq − 2αr) > 0,
where α, K, q, r are parameters, L is the given population. As is apparent from
this, the steady-state PPF is concave for some levels of M, given the parameters,
and convex for others.
Proposition 2. The long-run production possibilities frontier in M-H commodity space is convex-concave.
Some further analysis implies that the cubic in M is positive for all values of
M below a certain threshold M ∗ and negative for the others. In other words, the
P P F LR is concave (∀) M > M ∗ and is convex (∀) M < M ∗ for a certain limit level
of M ∗ , a function of the parameters of the system. Then, given the single inflexion
point M ∗ , the autarkic steady-state PPF will look like in Figure 4.26
26 Allowing for the possibility that some workers are idle in equilibrium does not change this
qualitative result.
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Notice that the PPF is convex in a neighbourhood of the H-axis, for values of
M lower than the threshold M ∗ and concave in a neighbourhood of the M-axis, for
values of M greater than M ∗ . The result concurs with the findings in Herberg and
Kemp (1969)27 and Panagariya (1981),28 which discuss the shape of the production
possibilities curve when two sectors have different returns to scale.
In our case, the shape of the PPF could be explained intuitively as follows. When
stock level is relatively high, the more damaging activity is harvesting. However,
when stock decreases and harvesting becomes less efficient due to the implicit stock
externality, manufacturing may become the more harmful activity.29 For levels of
M production lower than M*, starting from the case where all the labour force
is involved in harvesting and stock is relatively low, an extra worker shifted from
H to M will have a decreasing opportunity cost, due to the fact that the shift to
M impacts negatively on the productivity of labour in H. So, besides the direct
level effect of reducing the labour applied to H, moving an extra worker to M
production has a detrimental (negative but increasing) effect on the productivity of
the remaining workers in H. However, beyond the threshold level M*, manufacturing
starts having a lower negative impact on productivity in H than harvesting itself.30
In other words, when there is a lot of manufacturing, stock is relatively high and
harvesting is the more damaging activity for the resource. Then we are in the
concave part of the PPF, where shifting an extra worker from H to M has an
increasing opportunity cost due to the additional productivity benefit in H.
Proposition 3. The autarkic equilibrium is not efficient. It depends on the relative demand for the two commodities and on the relative strength of the externalities
as sources of inefficiency.
The shape of the PPF is important in deciding the pattern of specialization
triggered by trade. Still looking at the closed economy, the autarkic equilibrium
HA
outputs determined in section 2.3 are: H A = qβLS A which implies βL = qS
A =
MA
1−β , where p is
β
MA
1
dH
dM = p · 1−β − p2

H A p and L =
A

the autarkic relative price. Then we have
β dp
1−β dM ,

β
A
1−β M

=

1
p

where is in fact the relative price line in
·
H p and
Figure 4 above. Then we can compare the slope of the PPF at the equilibrium with
the slope of the relative price. The condition that the slope of the PPF is higher
than the slope of the price line reduces to:
L dp
2β − 1
.
>
p dM
1−β
Notice that for β > 12 , i.e. when domestic taste for H is strong and the equilibrium
occurs in the convex part of the PPF, the price line can be flatter than the PPF
27 See p. 414. Note that for the shape of the PPF around H = 0 in Fig.4 it suffices that we
have DRS in H.
28
The result is also discussed in Ethier (1982), p. 1263.
α(1−β)
29
and is more
The condition for M to be less harmful than H in autarky is S >
qβ
likely to hold the higher the stock level. This condition makes intuitive sense if we recall that it
is harder to catch the resource when it is sparse, whereas the marginal damage from pollution
is stock-independent. To make things interesting, we assume this condition can hold given our
parameters.
30

As derived in Appendix B, stock is not a monotonic function of M. In particular,

0 for M < M and
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slope. Similarly, if β < 12 , i.e. when domestic taste for M is strong the price line
tends to be steeper than the PPF at the autarkic equilibrium.
In the first case, with more general preferences, two equilibria can emerge, one
in the convex, one in the concave part of the PPF, while in the second case the
internal equilibrium is unique. It is argued in Appendix C that in a static setting,
opening up to trade from such an autarkic equilibrium can bring about any pattern
of specialization/diversification, as international trade acts as a vent for the internal
inter-sectoral tensions existing in the autarkic economy. We will return to use the
results in the next section of the paper.
Therefore, the autarkic equilibrium is likely to be situated at a point where the
price line is not tangent to the PPF, due to the external effects. If the domestic price
line is steeper than the PPF at equilibrium, the market undervalues the true cost of
the harvesting good H. Expanding production of M generates a negative externality
on H, the “private” exceeds the “social” marginal productivity of labour in M and
so there is overemployment of labour in M compared to what is efficient. If, on the
contrary, the domestic price line is flatter than the slope of the PPF at equilibrium,
the market undervalues the true cost of M due to the open-access externality. The
following discussion of the effects of trade will assume the first scenario: there is a
relatively strong domestic demand for M, the autarkic price line steeper than the
slope of the production frontier and a unique autarkic equilibrium.31
Proposition 4. The supply of manufacturing is not monotonic over the feasible
price: there exists a critical point where the slope of supply of M changes sign.
In order to study the stability properties of the autarkic equilibrium, plug the
expression for the stock derived in (2.11) into the relation between the relative price
and the stock found in (2.4) to get the inverse supply function:
(2.13)

p=

2r/q
1
=p
2
2
qS A
[q(L − M ) − r] K − 4rαKM − [q(L − M ) − r]K

The sign of the first derivative of S A with respect to M is not unambiguous.32 We
get the sufficient condition that the supply of M is upward sloping for:
2rα
r
(2.14)
M >L− + 2
q q K
While this is not a necessary condition33 and so it does not allow by exclusion the
identification of a complementary inequality that makes the supply upward sloping,
it shows that supply can be downward sloping over a range.
The intuition behind Figure 5 is the following: Initially, higher M yields lower
stock level S and lower productivity in H, which causes labour to shift from H to
M and lowers the price necessary for firms in M to break even, as p1 = qS. This
is a result commonly obtained in the increasing returns to scale trade models.34
Increasing production of manufacturing goods beyond M requires a higher price
due to the fact that production moves along the PPF in the concave section, where
the opportunity cost of producing more manufactures is increasing. Notice from
equation (2.12) that the relationship between M-production and the relative price
31 See Eaton and Panagariya (1979), p. 590, for a similar discussion.
32 See appendix B for derivation.

33 Such a condition has a much more complicated expression. See Appendix B for details.
34 E.g. Ethier (1982).
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is not monotonic, and so the price increases after supply of M reaches a threshold
value.
As Copeland and Taylor (1999) note,35 generally, multiplicity of equilibria is even in closed economies - a feature of the IRS models. Here, due to our utility
assumption, demand for M is M D = (1 − β)L a vertical line in the (M, p) space like
in Figure 5, and the autarkic equilibrium is at E or E’. In autarky the economy will
stay diversified due to the fact that both goods are essential for consumers. When
opening up to trade, the small open economy takes world price pw as given and three
possible equilibria emerge. The IRS literature result is that a diversified equilibrium
with trade becomes problematic (it is unstable) and specialization becomes possible.
However, as we argued before, all this is valid here only for a range of M values
(lower than M). For the other possible levels of manufacturing good production we
can have a diversified equilibrium even under free trade.36

Demand M

1/p

Supply M

u
s

s

E

MD

E’

M

s

pw

MD’
M

diversified
spec. H

spec. M

Figure 5
Thus, as can be seen in Figure 5, there are stable trading equilibria both when
the economy is specialized and when diversified. Trade opportunities create an
infinitely elastic demand for the goods produced domestically. If domestic demand
for M under autarky is at M D < M , trading (at domestic prices) will make the
autarkic equilibrium unstable. A small perturbation that increases production of
the manufacturing good will be self-reinforcing and push for specialization in M. If
0
domestic demand is at M D > M , the autarkic equilibrium will still be stable and
35 See argument on p. 145, Copeland and Taylor (1999).
36 Note that by altering the structure of the problem we may eliminate some of the cases and

make the results clearer. Yet, one of the purposes of the paper is to show that under the conditions
specified in the model, any specialization / diversification outcome is possible once the economy
opens up to trade. This is a source of the different results from the literature.
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so no specialization is induced if trade begins at autarkic prices. The analysis is
simpler when considering trade at international prices that differ from the pre-trade
domestic price. For world prices (1/pw ) low enough the economy will completely
specialize in H, while for prices high enough, the economy will specialize in M, as
is apparent from the graph.
3. The Open Economy Equilibrium
In the Brander and Taylor (1997) model, a country that exports the manufacturing good must gain from trade, and a country that has a comparative advantage in
the resource good but fails to fully specialize in it necessarily losses from trade. In
the present model this need not happen, as increased pollution caused by specialization in the dirty good hurts the resource.37 Partially specializing in M increases
the pollution pressure on the stock of the resource if M is more damaging than H.
Full specialization in H may make the small open economy better off. From here
one can learn that a successful industrialization process in a resource-abundant
developing-country must take pollution into account.
The analysis of the welfare changes brought about by trade in our small economy
looks first at the short-run impact and then the long-run effects are derived. In the
short-run, the PPF is linear. When opening up to trade, the small economy takes
as given the international price pw . If we denote by p the autarky steady-state
price, there are three possible cases: p < pw , p > pw or p = pw . If p > pw , the
country has a comparative advantage in M, will start by specializing in M (if the
world demand for M is strong enough, which we assume here for the small economy
case). Then M = L and the stock will evolve to S M . Depending on the parameters,
we may get extinction of the stock if S M becomes zero.
If p < pw , the country has a comparative advantage in H, will specialize in H
(again, given world demand for H is “large”). There will be more harvesting in the
economy, so the overexploitation problem worsens, but there is no pollution-related
negative impact on the stock. In a second case, if p = pw , the international price
is exactly equal to the autarkic opportunity cost of producing H, and so there are
no areas of comparative advantage. However, if the autarky-inherited equilibrium
is perturbed by increasing the M production, then productivity in the H-sector
declines if the stock decreases - i.e. S T < S A - as a result of the perturbation.38 If
the autarkic equilibrium were at a point like E in Figure 5, this is a self-reinforcing
process, leading to specialization in M, and so the initial autarkic diversified equilibrium is unstable. If at E’ in autarky, the pre-trade equilibrium is stable and there
will be no welfare changes taking place. If, on the contrary, S T > S A , meaning that
37 A similar conclusion is reached by Hannesson (2000). He takes the Brander and Taylor model
(which assumes constant returns to scale in the production of the other goods) and introduces
decreasing returns in the other (non-resource) sector. The outcome is the inverse of the Brander
and Taylor result: the country that partially specializes in the resource sector can gain from
trade, as the losses of increasing production in the diminishing returns alternative sector can be
limited through imports. Our setup differs from his in that it explicitly considers the production
externality and the returns are constant in the manufacturing sector and could be decreasing in
the resource sector. So, while he obtains a hump-shaped steady-state PPF, ours looks like in
Figure 4.
38 Like in Copeland and Taylor (1999), p. 147.
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the M sector is relatively less harmful to the natural resource than harvesting, then
productivity in H improves and the economy will return to a diversified production
state.
The effect of trade on welfare can be seen in a simple setting that depicts the
short-run responses of the PPF and PPC.
3.1. Comparative advantage in the resource good.
For Case 1, p < pw leads to comparative advantage in the resource good and
specialization in H in the small open economy. If H specialization is more harmful
than diversified autarkic production, then the stock of resource decreases and so
does the feasible level of H. Then the PPF rotates downward as in Figure 6, bringing
the PPC down with it. In the short run (SR) there are welfare gains, as the feasible
budget set is now the upper price line in Figure 6, while the PPF is still the autarkic
one. However, overexploitation of the resource dominates the beneficial pollution
reduction as far as the stock is concerned and so the autarkic equilibrium becomes
unfeasible. In the long run (LR) the stock S is lower and welfare (W) is lower
because the feasible consumption set shrinks, and we eventually get diversification
in production in the long run.39

H

World Price 1/pw

Autarky PPF
New PPF

Figure 6

M

If, on the contrary, S A < S H and the specialization in H allows the stock to
actually rebound, the PPF rotates upward and the country experiences short-run
gains from trade, as can be seen in Figure 7. Here, unlike in Brander and Taylor
(1997), initial specialization in H may make the country better off. This result is
obtained due to the beneficial result of spatial separation of industries. If the manufacturing is relatively more damaging to the resource, trade allows for an avenue
to decrease the tensions created by the pollution externality. Like in Copeland and
Taylor (1999), this non-traditional source of gains from trade can - for some values
of the parameters - offset the fact that the other source of inefficiency, namely the
open access problem, inevitably worsens.
39 This is confirmed in Appendix C, where Figure C1 depicts the movement from the autarkic
to trade production along the long-run PPF.
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H

World Price 1/pw

New PPF
Autarky PPF

Figure 7

M

3.2. No areas of comparative advantage for the small open economy.
For the relatively more complicated Case 2, p = pw does not confer any clear
comparative advantage to the country opening up to trade. If we assume a perturbation by slightly increasing M-production, then H-production decreases as a result
of the externality. If M is relatively more damaging, then S falls, production of H
falls more in the longer run, like in Figure 8.40 In the extreme case of complete specialization in M, the economy does not experience a welfare loss from trade in the
long-run, as the pre-trade bundle is still feasible because the PPC stays unchanged
at the world price line.41

H

World Price 1/pw

Autarky PPF

Figure 8

M

40 Here we can potentially get extinction of the stock due to the self-reinforcing pattern of
comparative advantage in M.
41 This result parallels one obtained in Brander and Taylor (1997).
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If M is relatively less damaging, S rises, H-production rises and the PPF rotates
up like in Figure 9. Therefore, the stock increases and also welfare increases. However, as labour productivity is higher in H, there will be a shift of workers from M
to H and the PPF can rotate back to be again coincidental with the international
price line and a diversified equilibrium obtains again in the long run. The overall
welfare effect is positive.
H
New PPF

World Price 1/pw

Autarky PPF

Figure 9

M

If, however, the perturbation of the diversified equilibrium is done by positively
shocking H-production, then if H is relatively more damaging we can get the situation in Figure 6 above. Starting at E in Figure 5, the diversified equilibrium is
unstable and it yields lower S and lower W. Yet, starting at E’, there will be no
welfare effect in the long run for the diversified economy, as the production point
will return to the pre-trade position. If H is relatively less damaging, then we get a
situation similar to the one illustrated in Figure 7 above, the diversified equilibrium
is unstable and we can get higher S and W. Note here how trade arises as a means
to spatially separate the two industries even in the absence of a price-dictated
comparative advantage.42
Thus, to summarize the discussion of these two cases, we can state the following
result:
Proposition 5. Specialization in the resource sector can be welfare improving
in the long run, provided that harvesting is relatively less damaging to the growth
of the resource.
3.3. Comparative advantage in the manufactured good.
In a third case, p > pw the country has a comparative advantage in the manufacturing good production and can increase M-production. Again, given the relative
harm inflicted by the two sectors on the stock of renewable resource, the economy
may lose from trade. In Figure 9, if H is relatively more damaging for the stock,
specializing in M reduces the pressure on the resource and allows the PPF to rotate upwards, increasing the productivity in harvesting. When the PPF becomes
coincidental with the world price line 1/pw , a diversified equilibrium is possible
42 This is one of the defining features of the Copeland and Taylor (1999) model.
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where the economy can experience a long run welfare gain, even though the PPF
can actually rotate back, depending on the production mix. However, if the manufacturing sector is relatively more damaging, the economy will behave similarly to
what we already described in Figure 6 above. Here the economy experiences net
loses in welfare terms in all cases except the long-run full specialization in M case.
Thus:
Proposition 6. Specialization in the manufacturing sector can be welfare reducing in the long run, provided that harvesting is relatively less damaging to the
growth of the resource.
Intuitively, the tradeoffs at play here are the following: If pA < pw , then H
can expand and M can contract and so adding to the usual gains from trade, the
overdepletion problem worsens, while the pollution problem improves. If pA > pw ,
M can expand and H can contract and the economy experiences less overdepletion,
but more pollution to add to the gains from trade. Note that while even partial
spatial separation of the two sectors allowed by trade adds to welfare, the persisting
externality acts in the opposite direction. This leads to net results that are less
categorical than those in the baseline models. To summarize the results above,
taking our preferred case whereby manufacturing sector is inflicting relatively more
damage on the stock (per unit of effort) than the harvesting per se,43 we can say
that opening up to trade seems to benefit the small open economy if it specializes in
the traditional/environment-based sector. A resource exporter benefits from trade,
taking advantage of the separation of the two industries, while a resource importer
can in fact do worse than in autarky, as pollution problem worsens. This result is
largely due to the fact that here the production externality dominates the overaccess
problem. The results are changing dramatically if the relative harmfulness of the
two sectors is inversed: If harvesting is more damaging for the resource, exporting
H is welfare reducing, while specializing in M is welfare improving in this case.
Here the overaccess externality dominates pollution in its negative effects and the
economy does better by industrializing.
4. Conclusion
To conclude, our model is different in its predictions from the two models that
were used as benchmarks. In Copeland and Taylor (1999), free trade was welfare
improving for the small economy. In Brander and Taylor (1997) free trade was
dominated by autarky from a welfare perspective. In our model with renewable
resource and negative production externality, if the small open economy specializes
in the sector that is less damaging for the stock of resource, trade can be welfare
improving. We have shown that in our model, unlike Brander and Taylor (1997),
specialization is possible in both sectors,44 and that the small resource-abundant
and exporting open economy does not necessarily have to lose from trade, if there
exists the collateral beneficial separation effect of the two industries. Trade exacerbates the open-access over-harvesting. Yet, by the industry separation permitted by
openness, the negative production externality declines in importance as a source of
inefficiency. Moreover, complete specialization in the resource good is not needed in
order to gain from trade. If H is relatively harmless for the resource stock, there will
43 This could be rationalized by the fact that harvesting affects only a fraction of the stock,
while pollution has a broader and longer-lasting impact on the resource.
44 In their model only specialization in the production of the manufacturing good is possible.
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be gains. Unlike the Copeland and Taylor (1999) model, free trade may be welfare
reducing, even when there is initial specialization in production, if specialization
takes place in the relatively more environmentally-harmful sector.
The central message of the paper is that pollution can have non-negligible
welfare effects even when there are no significant negative repercussions for consumers (possibly due to a relatively clean overall environment in a developing economy). Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) literature-inspired advice that incomeaugmenting development eventually brings cleaner environment may be misguided
due to the existence of negative production spillovers. It is argued that the country may lose in welfare terms even when exporting the dirty good. This occurs
because of the negative resource stock effect of the dirty good manufacturing and
the repercussions on the “traditional” or environment-intensive sector. Under this
scenario, even though overexploitation of the open-access resource is not a problem
exacerbated by trade openness, pollution depletes the resource and brings down
productivity in the resource-intensive sector. To the extent that the negative effect
dominates, the country as a whole loses from trade. On the other hand, it appears
that if the small open economy specializes in the resource good, even incompletely,
it may stand to gain from trade. In short, a possible policy lesson for a developing
renewable resource-rich economy is that industrializing at the expense of traditional
sectors may in fact lead to welfare losses, while specialization in the resource-based
sectors may lead to gains.
The paper looks at open access resources in a small open economy. Possible
extensions, that include endogenizing the international trading price formation in
a two-country setting, allowing for environmental policy in the form of taxes, or
establishment of property rights, together with are candidate subjects for future
study.
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